China Open Source Daily — 2026-11-02
On 2026-10-19 Qin Shuo published a 12,000-character investigation into the Chinese software industry, built on five firm interviews and Juyuan data: the 243 A-share listed B2B software companies grew revenue 7.9 percent across 2021-2025 while deducted non-recurring profit went from plus 17.89 billion yuan to minus 17.68 billion, and the share of loss-makers went from one in five in 2021 to 64.7 percent in H1 2026. In it is one sentence’s worth of institutional evidence that carries further than any aggregate: a provincial Department of Finance e-mall capped an IT package at 7.672 million yuan for a system serving 150,000 concurrent users across three administrative levels, and awarded it for 10 yuan. Verified for this briefing: the Ministry of Finance’s Caiku [2026] No. 2 notice, effective 2026-02-01, really does establish a four-threshold abnormal-low-price review at 50, 50, 45 and 65 percent, and really does apply outside the government-procurement domain nowhere. Qin diagnoses four mechanisms - lowest-price award driven by procurement officers’ fear of being blamed for choosing better, extended payment cycles, project-based rather than subscription business models, and SOE digital subsidiaries that take internal projects and subcontract the hard implementation work downward - and his five remedies, including redefining zizhu kekong from in-house development to substitutability and sustainable service, are a list of re-separations of a buyer, a rule-maker and a supplier that the Chinese state currently occupies all three of at once. The argument the article never makes: every property it asks procurement to reward is a property FLOSS licences are engineered to produce.