<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Tongxin on The Way of Open Source</title><link>https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/tags/tongxin/</link><description>Recent content in Tongxin on The Way of Open Source</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><copyright>Copyright (c) 2016 - 2026, 「开源之道」·适兕; all rights reserved.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 01:36:19 +0800</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/tags/tongxin/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>China Open Source Daily — 2026-09-11</title><link>https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/posts/china-open-source-daily/2026/09/2026-09-11/</link><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 01:36:19 +0800</pubDate><guid>https://www.opensourceway.blog/en/posts/china-open-source-daily/2026/09/2026-09-11/</guid><description>&amp;#34;Three institutional objects on three different surfaces — one ideological (Qiushi, the Party&amp;#39;s theoretical flagship), one diagnostic (Zhishashe, an independent institutional-economics analysis piece), one competitive (a WeChat-monitor Xinchuang-industry half-year scorecard). First, Chen Kaihua&amp;#39;s August 31 article in Qiushi (2026/17), a State Council-affiliated policy-researcher profiled as an invited professor at UCAS, formally places open source at the center of a national scientific-research reform agenda — for the first time, on a Chinese party-theoretical surface, listing 开源社区 (open-source community) alongside data platforms and AI research agents as a formal 科研主体 (research subject), and proposing &amp;#39;a national-level open-source community for AI-driven research&amp;#39; with an explicit mechanism combining &amp;#39;code contribution and compute incentive&amp;#39; (代码贡献与算力激励) — a structurally new institutional formulation on the same research-paradigm question that the September 9 briefing&amp;#39;s CCTV codification first broadcast to a general audience. Second, Qinghe, editor-in-chief of Zhishashe (智本社), publishes a ~7000-word institutional-economics comparative analysis — &amp;#39;中国大厂：两边通吃&amp;#39; (Chinese Big Cos: Eats Both Sides) — comparing commercial-credit behavior across 5,382 A-share non-financial firms versus 1,523 U.S. non-financial firms, documenting a 5.33-trillion-yuan net payable-receivable surplus on the Chinese side (8.4% of revenue) against a 0.14-trillion-dollar net deficit on the U.S. side (−1.2% of revenue), and reading Chinese large manufacturers as institutional &amp;#39;shadow banks&amp;#39; (影子银行) with interest-income-to-interest-expense coverage rising from 38% to 97% over 2017-2025 — an independent diagnostic that pairs directly with this series&amp;#39; August 26 Heilan &amp;#39;going-global&amp;#39; institutional critique, applying the same institutional-economics frame to a different institutional surface (domestic commercial credit, not export). Third, Xinchuang-Lutoushe (信创露透社) publishes a September 1 half-year scorecard for 36 Xinchuang vendors across 8 segments — the sharpest institutional-economics finding being the divergence between the hardware layer (Cambricon 半年净赚23亿 turning profitable at 2.3B yuan, Muxi turning profitable at 0.6B yuan, Hygon at 9.1B revenue 12.16x the next-largest domestic-CPU rival) and the integration-vendor layer (Taiji dropping its profit 281x to a 350M yuan loss on a 72% market-cap decline from its April 2023 peak) — an institutional-form observation about where the domestic-substitution process is producing cash flow versus where it is producing debt and loss. One perspective, not a verdict.&amp;#34;</description></item></channel></rss>